There is a stark difference between two monuments that stand outside Humboldt University in Berlin.
1 The first monument lists Dietrich Bonhoeffer among the names of twelve people who died between 1938-1945. The inscription gathers the names as 'those who fell in the struggle against Hitler's fascism'. Beside the list, two contorted fists protrude from iron bars wound with barbed wire. There is no facial representation. Although Bonhoeffer lost his teaching license in 1936, in part for association with an illegal seminary, the university now places him with the collective that commands the attention of current students and faculty. 'Their death is an obligation to us', the inscription reads.
The second monument features the name 'Hegel' on a tall stone column with no identifying date, place, or title. The bust at the top is pitched slightly forward, lips pursed and eyes intent. The clarity of the presentation calls to mind Hegel's description of the philosopher, particularly in contrast to the political actor. In a lecture delivered at the university in the 1820s, Hegel states that in political history 'the subject of deeds and events is the individual in his particular natural make-up, genius, passions, energy, or weakness of character -in a word, what makes him this individual'.
2 The philosopher who surveys that history stands in marked contrast:
Here on the other hand the productions are all the more excellent the less is their merit attributed to a particular individual, the more, on the other hand, do they belong to freedom of thinking, to the general character of the human being as human being, the more is thinking itself, devoid of personality, the productive subject.
volved in a claim to discern the course of reason in world history without explicitly accounting for oneself. 4 Bonhoeffer draws on Heidegger to take a similar critical line, stating that 'Hegel wrote a philosophy of angels, not of human beings as Dasein'.
5 Idealism, especially as represented by Hegel, appears to have reached a 'synopsis of act and being', Bonhoeffer observes, 'if only those doing the philosophising themselves did not founder on the resistance of their own reality to this philosophy '. 6 The stark difference between the monuments should not obscure the significant similarities between Bonhoeffer and Hegel. Although they each offered original contributions to their fields of theology and philosophy, neither understood himself as an 'individual' thinker. Each sought to articulate the constitutive social aspect of human reason, acknowledging the question of God as integral to this task. Engaging the Lutheran theological tradition, each sought to challenge a sharp distinction between divinity and humanity, taking seriously the ways that revelation 'becomes' the community. Specifically, convictions about the 'real presence' of Christ in the Eucharist led them to articulate an account of God not only within, but as human social relations. These endeavours carried strong ethical implications, as shown throughout their highly contested reception histories.
B. From Disruptive Word to Revelatory Community
A great deal of Bonhoeffer's critical engagement with Hegel involves the relation of Word, the divine address embodied in Christ, to Geist, collective 'spirit' or 'mind'. With Hegel in view, Bonhoeffer will often portray the Word as a disruptive presence vis-à-vis communal patterns of reason and practice. He signals this approach in his first dissertation, Sanctorum Communio, by claiming that 'the Word is the rock upon which the Idealist Geist-monism founders'. 8 By speaking of a 'disruption of the Word' in this sense, Bonhoeffer draws on a Lutheran commitment to the 'external' Word while also 4 'Too bad that Hegel, merely for the sake of illusion, did not have 1843 years at his disposal, for then he presumably would have had time to make the test as to whether the absolute method, which could explain all world history, could also explain the life of one single human being. ' Bonhoeffer's emphasis on the disruptive Word is provoked, in part, by Hegel's focus on the work of the spirited community in the construction of doctrine. Hegel asserts that doctrine is not produced by the 'Word of Christ, so to speak', but by the community. 10 In Nicholas Adams' gloss, Hegel criticises religious thinking because 'it treats what it freely produces as something alienly received'.
11 As Adams also notes, however, Hegel's response risks its own 'false opposition'. I argue that such overcorrection provokes Bonhoeffer to accentuate the externality of the Word. As Bonhoeffer nevertheless maintains Luther's insistent 'est', testimony to the present Christ given in and through the community, his work is a promising resource for intra-Lutheran 'repair'.
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The task of 'repair' involves attending to the nuance in both Hegel's and Bonhoeffer's positions, which are not reducible to the GegenlogosMenschenlogos dialectic. For one, Hegel is also conditioned by a Lutheran emphasis on the community's reception. In a statement highlighted in Bonhoeffer's edition of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel states that concerning 'positive' elements of the 'absolute religion', 'everything must come to us in an external manner'.
13 Moreover, Bonhoeffer does not merely portray the Word as an external, disruptive force. Act and Being is an attempt to challenge a reduction of revelation to mere 'act' -a punctiliar disruption of otherwise immanent processes. To that end, he states that revelation is 'held fast' by the community:
God gives the divine self in Christ to the community of faith and to every individual as member of this community of faith. This happens in such a way that the acting subject in the community of faith, proclaiming and believing, is Christ…Hence the gospel is somehow held fast here. God's freedom has woven itself into this personlike community of faith, and it is precisely this which manifests what God's freedom is: that God binds God's self to human beings. 14 9 Dorrien goes on to note the irony that 'for all of Barth' The adjective 'revelatory' is taken from the subtitle of the third volume of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, the focus of Bonhoeffer's 1933 seminar. This text records Hegel's use of the evocative phrase 'God existing as community' in the context of his engagement with the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist. Revelation was not merely ecclesial for Hegel, however, and much of his other work attends to social 'orders' beyond the church. 16 That broader philosophical project was shaped inevitably by Hegel's status as a civil servant at the recently founded University of Berlin in the early nineteenth century.
Insofar as Bonhoeffer also portrays the ways that revelation becomes the community, Hegel's claim to 'God existing as community' proves congenial to his work. However, from his first dissertation onwards Bonhoeffer persistently changes the subject so that the phrase reads 'Christ existing as community'. That variation can stand as a shorthand for Bonhoeffer's complex engagement with Hegel over Christology, ecclesiology, history, and political philosophy. It indicates a posture of reception that I characterise as both eclectic and Christologically intent. Such characteristics are also conditioned by history, of course: Bonhoeffer's variations on Hegel were part of a critical response to the work of church 'deconfessionalisation' that had occurred in the intervening years.
C. Ferment of the Mind: Textual Reception and its 'Matrices'
This study prioritises Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel's texts. The key work for his exposition is the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Georg Lasson. Bonhoeffer also refers to Hegel's Phenomenology of Geist, Philosophy of Right, and Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. During the dissertations, many of his interactions come at second-hand, in and through the work of supervisors. My study will therefore focus on the lectures 15 As Bonhoeffer states: 'The church is the presence of Christ in the same way that Christ is the presence of God. The New Testament knows a form of revelation, "Christ existing as community". ' DBWE 1, DBW 1, 87. 16 This broader interest is indicative of his Lutheran commitment. As Stephen Houlgate observes, Hegel credits Luther with stressing that 'Christian faith and love are properly expressed in the sittlich spheres of family life and civil society'. Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 263-64. Bonhoeffer delivered in 1932-33, as they surround his expository Hegel seminar.
The textual focus of this study is important in light of the interpretive challenge posed by both Hegel's and Bonhoeffer's writings, which led Karl Barth to advise care in approaching their respective works. As to Bonhoeffer, Barth praises his early ecclesiology, as well as his clear and courageous response to the oppression of the Jews, even as he questions the elusiveness of Bonhoeffer's theological terms. 'Do we not always expect him to be clearer and more concise in some other context', Barth writes to a correspondent, 'either by withdrawing what he said, or by going even further?' 17 Fifteen years later, in a letter to Eberhard Bethge, Barth opines that systematic theology was not Bonhoeffer's strongest field and laments that Bonhoeffer's turbulent life and early death cut short his remarkable ability to evolve. 18 Barth also counsels interpretive caution when reading Hegel. Commenting on Hegel's far more developed body of work and longer reception history, Barth queries whether the true age of Hegel was yet to come. Whether or not Hegel would become the 'Aquinas' of Protestantism, Barth warns readers to think three times before contradicting him, for they would likely find their contradiction already voiced within Hegel's system -and given its best possible answer. 19 It is a warning often ignored by critics that overstate the effectiveness of a young doctoral student's criticism.
Claims to intellectual influence extend well beyond textual transmission, of course. While text-focused 'genealogical' enquiries are often sophisticated, Kwame Anthony Appiah warns that 'that metaphor is perhaps too determinate -in the mode of those biblical catalogs of begats -to capture the ferment of the mind'. 20 Appiah speaks instead of 'matrices', attention to which involves wider political currents as well as a variety of a thinker's peers in order to gain a sense of what ideas were 'in the air'. 21 This study will identify two additional matrices involved in Bonhoeffer's reception: interlocutors and political context.
As to interlocutors, Bonhoeffer received much of his Hegel education from Reinhold Seeberg, his first doctoral supervisor, as well as Wilhelm Lütgert, who specialised in Idealism and supervised Bonhoeffer's Habilitationschrift. Moreover, Bonhoeffer's university courses, including a 1927 series on the philosophy of culture by Eduard Spranger, exposed him to the neo-Hegelian 'revival' of the 1920s. 22 As shown by his early seminar papers, he was also aware of a larger 'speculative trajectory' that followed on from Hegel and minimised confessional and biblical interest. 23 Alongside these Berlin instructors, Bonhoeffer's thinking was also formed through a longstanding dialogue with his friend and fellow student Franz Hildebrandt, whose own dissertation appropriates several of Hegel's ideas.
As to the political context, there was a significant movement of German neo-Hegelianism in Bonhoeffer's time. Although Bonhoeffer was no longer based in the academy after 1936, the work of legal philosophers such as Carl Schmitt and Karl Larenz would have confronted him through laws introduced under the Third Reich. Neo-Hegelianism, however contestable its claim to Hegel's thought, came to present a nationalist and exclusive political settlement.
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This contextual note should be qualified, however, by the fact that Bonhoeffer did not have a mono-cultural experience of Hegel reception. During his exchange period in America, for instance, he came across the work of W.E.B. Du Bois, whose critical work with Hegel cut against the grain of national and racial exceptionalism.
D. From Theology to Philosophy -and Back Again
This book draws on recent scholarship that depicts Hegel as a philosopher who is interested in the logical forms derived from Christian doctrine. 25 In other 22 The background of emerging movements emphasising synthesis or 'the whole' is recounted in Fritz Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community 1890 Community -1933 , Reprint ed. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1990), 305-314, 365, 384-403. 23 In a 1926 seminar paper, Bonhoeffer observes that '[s]ince Schleiermacher, theology had partly been allowed to grow speculative and wild -this is especially evident in Hegel's student Biedermann -and partly was constrained by biblicism. At any rate it seemed to have distanced itself a long way from Lutheran-Reformed doctrine '. DBWE 9, 404; DBW 17, 30 [published in the Register und Ergänzungen] . 24 See Andreas Grossmann, 'German neo-Hegelianism and the Plea for Another Hegel', in The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume II, ed. John Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 232-259. 25 I draw on Adams' distinction between philosophy -a 'second-order discourse' that investigates systems of classification and the rules that govern judgments -and theology as a 'first-order' task of articulating doctrinal loci that takes its categories and rules of judgment for granted. Adams, Eclipse, words, I do not read him primarily as a theologian, much less one who seeks to revise Christian dogma. Such an explicitly doctrinal project is suggested by titles that depict him as a 'theologian of Spirit' or as developing a distinct 'Christology'. 26 Hegel's multi-layered treatment of Geist, typically translated 'spirit', can lead to the assumption that he develops an alternative pneumatology. I argue, in contrast, that Hegel does not offer a competing theology of the Holy Spirit, even though Trinitarian doctrine informs his philosophical account. If Hegel is primarily interested in Christian theology in order to investigate its logic, rather than to articulate an idiosyncratic doctrinal statement, his work may be less threatening to the theologian. 27 Insofar as threat does exist, it is best handled by a 'turn to the texts' following a period marked by broad and misleading overviews.
28 Such expositional work should acknowledge diachronic distinction while identifying both 'epic' and 'dramatic' tendencies in Hegel's thought.
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Along with depicting Hegel as a philosopher first, I readily acknowledge Hegel's insistence on his Lutheran confession. As Hegel was also accused of heterodoxy during his lifetime, often for holding a form of 'pantheism', he sought to defend himself both in published works and personal correspondence. To take one example, in a late letter, Hegel asserts his defence against challenges to the integrity of his Christian doctrine, while criticising rationalist approaches to the Trinity in turn: 'I am a Lutheran, and through philosophy have been at once completely confirmed in Lutheranism. I detest seeing such things explained in the same manner as perhaps the descent and dissemination of silk culture, cherries, smallpox, and the like'.
30 Although there were important political motivations behind such a profession, Stephen Houlgate rightly states that it would be 'wilful to dismiss this as subterfuge'.
31 I therefore attend to the confessional aspects of Hegel's texts, demurring over claims that he is inadvertently heterodox or practically an atheist.
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Along with having a basis in Lutheran theology, Hegel's philosophy has itself become a source for much subsequent theology. Adams observes that Hegel's work 'generates the German philosophical lexicon through which many of the imaginative moves in the twentieth century are cast'.
33 As a result of Hegel's pervasive influence, a theologian can be overtly critical of him while still appropriating his thought forms. 34 Insofar as Bonhoeffer works downstream from Hegel, many of his terminological and conceptual choices are best understood by having Hegel's project in view. At times he will react against his predecessor, of course. For instance, Bonhoeffer's depiction of the disruptive Word should be understood as, in part, a reaction against a Lutheran 'pneumaticism' that informs Hegel's project. 35 Indeed, I argue that the background of Hegel's account of Geist helps to explain why Bonhoeffer does not give much explicit attention to pneumatology as a doctrinal locus. 36 Rather than criticising him for lacking systematic 'balance', a reader can come to appreciate his attempt to foreground what is lacking in his time, namely, the distinctive 'mind' and body of Christ.
This book comes at a period of renewed interest in Hegel in English-language scholarship. Hegel's published works are in the midst of being translated for new critical editions. 37 Another set of volumes presents Hegel's various lecture series in diachronic rather than composite fashion. 38 39 At least three dominant schools of philosophical interpretation can be identified: materialist readings, based in the Phenomenology, which tends to collapse divine agency into an atheistic history; neo-pragmatist readings in which Hegel works from the Kantian project to articulate the social construction of reality; and metaphysical readings that refer primarily to the Science of Logic and Encyclopaedia with an emphasis on the concept of 'infinity'. 40 In the midst of such interest, theological concerns are frequently marginal. It is a particularly critical time, then, for reception accounts of particular theologians that show how Hegel both receives Christian doctrine and comes to influence it in turn.
Bonhoeffer certainly understood philosophy with a view to its doctrinal origins. He observes at one point that German-Continental traditions, including Idealism, 'are based on philosophical-methodological demands derived from theological insights'. 41 In Ethics, he describes the political crisis of the early 1940s as a time when many important philosophical concepts find a way back to their origin in the church after a period of estrangement. 42 The language of estrangement and return is ironic when heard in relation to Hegel, whose account of Geist proceeds through such a movement. In any case, Bonhoeffer speaks of recovered alliance more often than threat in his later writings. E. Beyond Revolt: A Case for 'Eclectic' Reception Bonhoeffer tends to allow philosophy its own integrity while making his resolutely theological interest clear. As early as Sanctorum Communio he compares philosophical and theological enquiry through the analogy of how sound is perceived. 'Just as sound lies in different spheres of perception for musicians and physicists,' Bonhoeffer claims, 'so it is with time for Idealist epistemology and for a Christian concept of person, without the one sphere cancelling out the other'. 43 Having identified disciplinary difference, Bonhoeffer frequently sidesteps philosophical questions, declining, for example, debate on the existence of an 'external world'.
This study presents Bonhoeffer's employment of philosophy, among other disciplines, in the service of his first-order theological work. The first sentence of Bonhoeffer's preface to Sanctorum Communio makes his regular intention clear: 'in this study social philosophy and sociology are employed in the service of theology'. 44 As Michael Mawson has argued, Bonhoeffer is not primarily interested in providing grounds for a dialogue between disciplines. 45 Moreover, Bonhoeffer's willingness to engage philosophical terms is tempered by the awareness that the transferral of concepts can 'burst the framework' of the host discipline. 46 When such a threat is identified, he is willing to issue sharp criticism of philosophical figures and movements, as shown in his depiction of 'Idealism' as particularly susceptible to the 'incurvature of the self'.
Why then did Bonhoeffer choose to lead an expositional seminar on Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion in 1933? In Jörg Rades' words, Bonhoeffer sought to recover, in the midst of a crisis in German history, his lost cultural inheritance 'in the proper way by reading and then interpreting it'. 47 Such broader cultural interest is always framed by Bonhoeffer's commitments to the authority of scripture and the Lutheran confessions. In other words, he read Hegel for the task of ecclesial theology before any desire to produce work that is 'philosophically interesting'. As a result, Bonhoeffer does not stake everything either for or against Hegel. He remained, as Ralf Wüstenberg observes, adherent to no single philosophical school. 48 Gollwitzer, Helmut 16
